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While most people are 
paid by the hour or with 
a yearly salary, some are 
also paid bonuses. And, 
some are paid very large, 
all-or-nothing bonuses.
Massive Kinked Bonuses
My favorite recent example is from 
last summer when golfer Darren 
Clarke earned a $3-million bonus 
from his sponsor. But it was how 
the payout was structured more 
than the amount that so intrigued 
me — his sponsor’s payout was 
all or nothing.
All or Nothing?
For some time, Clarke wore the 
logo of sporting goods company Dunlop on his golf shirt 
and was paid nothing unless something extraordinary 
happened. The golfer from Northern Ireland agreed with 
Dunlop that he would wear the logo in all tournaments 
and would be paid only if he won a major tournament. 
There are four major tournaments in golf: the Masters, the 
U.S. Open, the British Open and the PGA Championship. 
Going into the British Open tournament, the 42-year old 
Clarke was ranked 111th in the world and had never won 
a major championship. When he won the British Open, he 
collected the $1.45-million winner’s check and the win-
and-take-all $3-million bonus from Dunlop (Larry Dorman, 
The New York Times, July 18, 2011).
How (or against what work-related objective) people 
are paid is fascinating. It is particularly interesting in this 
case of very, very large bonuses. The sports odds that 
Darren Clarke would win the tournament going into it were 
roughly 200 to 1. Winning $3 million at odds of 200 to 1 
calculates to an expected payment of $3 million divided 
by 200, or $15,000.
But did this all-or-nothing bonus motivate him differently 
than paying him $15,000 flat out for just wearing the logo 
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question
in a single tournament? And if so, motivate him to do what? 
Show more methodical and conservative conduct? Doubtful, 
since one could argue that the payout structure could have 
created incentives to the contrary. Be a better golfer by 
making him hungrier for the win? (Would he really have 
been less hungry without the all-or-nothing bonus?) Be a 
better billboard for the sponsor? Certainly the sports world 
was buzzing about the Dunlop deal last summer getting 
the company more publicity than normal for sponsoring 
an athlete, and folks (like me) are still talking and writing 
about it. Clarke did win a major, after all.
What Research Says
Many people are paid bonuses, many more are paid for 
their time and some are paid for piece work. An important 
research paper in the area is Edward Lazear’s “Salaries 
versus Piece Rates” ( Journal of Business, July 1986) that 
nicely outlines the costs and benefits of paying in different 
forms while considering issues like incentives, risk, and 
relative and absolute values of output. The issues are 
obviously complicated and many people are paid small 
bonuses very frequently (think for a moment about tips and 
sales contracts and all of the people who are compensated 
this way).
Many economists believe that folks are paid such bonuses 
because it is efficient and mutually beneficial, especially 
given the constraints mentioned by Lazear. Others feel 
that many who receive large bonuses do so in ways that 
are not entirely open or appropriate. This lack of transpar-
ency combined with an all-or-nothing high-stakes payout 
increases the likelihood of adverse behavior — such 
as short-termism, unethical actions or undermining the 
productivity of colleagues (and therefore the company) 
in trade for increasing one’s own pay. Massive kinked 
bonuses, like Darren Clarke’s $3-million all-or-nothing in 
golf are very rare, but worth discussing, as generalizable 
lessons can be learned from extreme events.
Should Boards Pay Massive 
Bonuses to Themselves?
A few years ago a major international company had an 
arrangement where it essentially paid its directors a bonus 
if earnings hit a certain target and nothing otherwise (this 
wasn’t precisely the arrangement but it’s accurate enough for 
our discussion). Does this system, where a board director 
was paid roughly $500,000 if the firm hits a certain target 
of earnings per share and absolutely nothing if the firm 
does not, get the directors to care about the bottom line 
and be aligned with shareholders? Yes. But, in the event 
that the company has earnings that are close to the target 
but aren’t quite there, hasn’t this compensation contract 
created an environment where inappropriate accounting 
methods or short-sighted manipulations are more tempting 
than ever? Absolutely! Paying massive kinked bonuses may 
work in some circumstances where the adverse incentives 
created are low-harm, but directors’ pay is not one of them.
Other Sports Examples
One can argue whether in sports the adverse incentives 
created by kinked or all-or-nothing bonuses are low-
harm. But these kinds of arrangements are increasing in 
popularity. It was revealed in January that Tim Tebow, 
the young quarterback for the NFL’s Denver Broncos, was 
to earn a $250,000 bonus for each playoff win his team 
had (so long as he played 70 percent of the time during 
the season). Tebow played in more than 70 percent of the 
games and the Broncos won one playoff game.
Also in January it was revealed that if Louisiana State 
University (LSU) won the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) 
against Alabama and became BCS National Champions, 
LSU’s coach Les Miles would have his salary raised by 
$980,000 for each of the six years left on his contract. 
Does this seem like an odd number? Maybe. But Alabama 
coach Nick Saban is contracted to earn $4.73 million in 
2012 and Miles (who now earns $3.751) had a clause in his 
contract with LSU to pay him $1,000 more per year than 
the highest paid coach in his league (who just happens 
to be Alabama’s Saban). (Brad Wolverton, The Chronicle 
of Higher Education, Jan. 5, 2012). Alabama won the 
game (21-0) with crushing defense so Coach Miles’ pay is 
$980,000 less this coming year than it would have been 
otherwise. As I have noted previously (May 2011 in this 
column), relative pay matters a lot.
Some consider the true value of sports is that the games 
teach lessons for life. In addition to that, and just being 
interesting, sports also teach lessons for compensation. 
